




Business association statutes may be "linked" in the sense that rules from
one statute are applied to a business form created under another statute. For
example, the Uniform Partnership Act (the "UPA"), the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act (the "ULPA"),2 and the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership
Act ("RULPA") 3 provide that general partnership provisions apply to limited
partnerships.4 Although linkage has long been an accepted feature of the law
of business associations, it creates confusion about the applicable law. It also
may cause application of inappropriate rules to linked business forms. For
example, rules that make sense for informal general partnerships with co-equal,
personally liable owner-managers may not be appropriate for formally created
limited partnerships with passive limited liability owners.'
While linkage has created difficulties in limited partnership law, it is now
spreading to new standard forms, including the limited liability company (the
"LLC") and the limited liability partnership (the "LLP"). Also, linkage
threatens to create uncertainties about the extent to which the new general
partnership rules in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act ("RUPA")6 apply to
existing limited partnerships.7 These new developments necessitate a reevalua-
tion of linkage.8
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1. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT (last amended 1914) [hereinafter UPA], 6 U.L.A. 1 (1969).
2. UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT (last amended 1916) [hereinafter ULPA], 6 U.L.A. 559
(1969).
3. REVISED UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT (last amended 1985) [hereinafter RULPA], 6
U.L.A. 447 (Supp. 1995).
4. See infra part II.A.
5. For a theoretical overview of the limited partnership form, see Larry E. Ribstein, An Applied
Theory of Limited Partnership, 37 EMORY L.J. 835 (1988).
6. [REVISED] UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT (last amended 1994) [hereinafter RUPA], 6 U.L.A. 280
(Supp. 1995).
7. See Allan W. Vestal, A Comprehensive Uniform Limited Partnership Act? The Time Has Come,
28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1195 (1995) (concluding, as does the present article, that limited partnership
law should be delinked from general partnership law); infra text accompanying notes 16-17 (discussing
application of RUPA to limited partnerships).
8. A Joint Editorial Board of National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and
the ABA was recently established, the first project of which is to study linkage among the UPA,
RULPA, and RUPA. See 9 PUBOGRAM 4 (Oct. 1994). Also, a workshop on linkage issues was
presented by the Committee on Partnerships and Unincorporated Business Organizations at the Spring
1995 ABA Business Law Section meeting in San Antonio, Texas.
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This article evaluates linkage within the framework of a theoretical
understanding of the economic role of standard forms. The article initially
concludes that RULPA should be revised to delink limited partnerships from
general partnerships. In place of linkage, courts would fill gaps in the limited
partnership statute by considering the distinct attributes of limited partnerships
rather than by drawing from general partnership law. The article then extends
this analysis to other applications of linkage in the law of business associations,
including formal linkage between close and "standard" corporations, formal
linkage between LLPs and standard general partnerships, and the informal
linkage created by including general and limited partnership statutory provisions
in LLC acts.
Part II of this article discusses the current law and the historical origins of
linkage. Part III examines the costs and benefits of linkage, concluding that the
benefits of drawing on the statutory language and case law regarding general
partnerships are outweighed by the costs of interfering with the functions of
separate statutory standard forms. This conclusion supports a general rule of
delinkage, emphasizing the need for separate default rules for limited and
general partnerships. Part IV works through the details of delinkage by
considering how a delinked limited partnership statute should be drafted and
how the courts should resolve individual limited partnership issues using a
delinked approach. Part V extends the analysis to linkage involving close
corporations, LLCs, and LLPs.
II
OVERVIEW OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP LINKAGE
This part reviews the provisions that link limited partnerships and general
partnerships. It then analyzes the effect of those provisions on limited
partnership law.
A. The Linkage Provisions
The most important partnership linkage provision is UPA section 6(2), which
states:
[A]ny association formed under any other statute of this state, or any statute adopted
by authority, other than the authority of this state, is not a partnership under this act,
unless such association would have been a partnership in this state prior to the
adoption of this act; but this act shall apply to limited partnerships except in so far as
the statutes relating to such partnerships are inconsistent herewith.9
Although this provision defines a limited partnership as a nonpartnership,
it nevertheless treats a limited partnership as a partnership unless the limited
partnership statute is "inconsistent."
9. UPA § 6(2), 6 U.L.A. at 22.
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Contrary to the UPA, the ULPA explicitly defines a limited partnership as
a "partnership.""0 The ULPA provides that "a general partner shall have all
the rights and powers and be subject to all the restrictions and liabilities of a
partner in a partnership without limited partners," except that a general partner
has no power to bind the partnership as to certain acts without the limited
partners' consent." The ULPA also permits linkage under a general provision
that applies "the rules of law and equity, including the law merchant" to "any
case not provided for in this act.' '
Like the ULPA, RULPA defines a limited partnership as a "partnership" 3
and provides that a general partner has the rights, powers, restrictions, and
liabilities of a partner in a partnership with no limited partners.14 It also
makes a more explicit linkage than the ULPA by providing that "[i]n any case
not provided for in this [Act], the provisions of the [UPA] govern."15 RULPA
linkage language is broader than the UPA's to the extent that it permits
application of the UPA whenever there is no analogous RULPA provision. The
UPA linkage language might preclude application of the UPA if RULPA's
silence on an issue is interpreted as a negative pregnant and therefore "inconsis-
tent" with the UPA.
RUPA does not explicitly provide for linkage and defines "partnership" so
as to exclude limited partnerships. 6 However, the linkage language in
RULPA arguably controls even after a state adopts RUPA 7 Also, RUPA
creates a link with limited partnership law that did not previously exist by
providing for mergers and conversions of limited and general partnerships.
10. ULPA § 1, 6 U.L.A. at 562.
11. Id. § 9, 6 U.L.A. at 586-87; see also id. § 12(2), 6 U.L.A. at 596-97 (directing that one who is
both a general and a limited partner has "all the rights and powers and [is] subject to all the restrictions
of a general partner").
12. Id § 29, 6 U.L.A. at 617.
13. RULPA § 101(7), 6 U.L.A. at 449 (Supp. 1995).
14. Id. § 403, 6 U.L.A. at 528.
15. Id. § 1105, 6 U.L.A. at 610.
16. See RUPA § 101(4), 6 U.L.A. at 285 (Supp. 1995) (providing that "partnership" means the
entity formed "under Section 202, predecessor law, or comparable law of another jurisdiction"); id.
§ 202(b), 6 U.L.A. at 237 (providing that "[a]n association formed under a statute other than this [Act],
a predecessor statute, or a comparable statute of another jurisdiction is not a partnership"). These
provisions imply that one cannot be a partner solely by virtue of owning an interest in a limited
partnership. RUPA does not clarify the issue, as it fails to define "partner."
17. See Vestal, supra note 7, at 1202-07 (concluding that RULPA should be interpreted as referring
to RUPA). There may be some confusion about which general partnership law RULPA refers to after
a state adopts a new general partnership law based on RUPA. A few states, including Montana and
Wyoming, have enacted versions of RUPA. The Wyoming limited partnership statute explicitly refers
to the new partnership law. WYO. STAT. § 17-14-1009(a) (Supp. 1994). However, the Montana Code
states more generally that "the provisions of the [UPA] (Title 35, chapter 10) govern." MONT. CODE
ANN. § 35-12-503 (1993). The citation is to the location of both the new and revised partnership
statutes. Since the limited partnership provision was not changed following the adoption of the new
general partnership law, an argument can be made that the limited partnership statute refers to the old,
repealed general partnership statute.
18. See infra part II.B.10.
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B. Effect of Linkage
The linkage provisions discussed above cause much confusion in limited
partnership law. Linkage seems clear for limited partnership provisions with no
UPA analogues, where limited partnership law clearly applies, and for limited
partnership issues with no limited partnership provisions, where general
partnership law clearly applies. But questions often arise in determining
whether the limited partnership statute actually provides for the case under the
RULPA linkage rule or is inconsistent with the UPA under the UPA linkage
rule. For example, it is unclear whether the UPA or RUPA applies where a
general topic, such as general partners' rights on dissolution or withdrawal, is
covered in the limited partnership act but a specific issue, such as rescission for
fraud or the profits-or-interest election, is not covered.19 The question is
whether the silence of the limited partnership act should be interpreted as a
negative pregnant or as simply not covering the particular issue.2' The
following subsections consider specific examples of linkage confusion.
1. Formalities of Organization. The organizational formalities provided for
in the ULPA2' and RULPA22 have no counterpart in the UPA, because the
general partnership traditionally is an informal business association. Thus,
limited partnership law clearly applies on these matters.
RUPA, however, creates uncertainty in this respect. Two types of RUPA
formalities may apply to limited partnerships-merger and conversion
provisions' and provisions for filings that notify third parties concerning
partners' authority.24 Although RUPA provides that it does not apply to
limited partnerships, the RULPA linkage provision arguably refers to these
provisions. 2
5
Even if the state's version of RULPA is deemed to link generally with
RUPA, RUPA filing provisions do not apply under RULPA section 1105 if they
deal with cases provided for in RULPA. Although RULPA does not provide
19. See UPA § 42, 6 U.L.A. at 521.
20. In answering this question, it may make a difference whether the state has adopted RUPA and
repealed the UPA so that only the RULPA linkage provision applies. See supra text following note
15 (discussing potentially different meanings of UPA and RULPA linkage provisions).
21. ULPA § 2, 6 U.L.A. at 568.
22. RULPA §§ 201-09, 6 U.L.A. at 472 (Supp. 1995).
23. See infra part II.B.10.
24. RUPA §§ 303, 304, 704, 805, 6 U.L.A. at 302, 304, 333, 340 (Supp. 1995) (permitting
partnerships to file statements of authority, denial, dissociation, and dissolution).
25. Courts might decide that provisions for extensive formalities are so radically different from the
scheme of the UPA that the legislature did not intend to link such provisions with limited partnerships
when it passed the state's version of RUPA unless the legislature specifically amended the limited
partnership provision to refer to the new partnership provisions, as the Wyoming legislature did. See
supra note 17. Even under a Montana-type statute, courts could hold that the legislature's failure to
change the cross-reference to the general partnership act in the state's version of RULPA indicates an
intent to refer to the new statute that is covered by the old cross-reference. See MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 35-12-503 (1993).
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for statements of authority, courts nevertheless might decide that RULPA
excludes the RUPA provisions concerning formalities because RULPA provides
comprehensively for formalities applicable to limited partnerships. The latter
approach is supported by a RULPA provision stating that a limited partnership
certificate is notice that the partnership is a limited partnership and that persons
designated as general partners are such, but that it is not notice of other facts. 26
By explicitly precluding the partnership from binding third parties by notice of
authority in the certificate, RULPA appears to occupy the field on this issue
and therefore cannot be overridden by RUPA. On the other hand, RULPA
does not specifically authorize or prohibit filings of RUPA-type statements of
authority. These RUPA provisions could be reconciled with the RULPA
provision on certificate notice since the RUPA provisions are better designed
than the limited partnership certificate to notify third parties of partner
authority.
2. Partnership Property. Because neither the ULPA nor RULPA includes
provisions on partnership property, the UPA27 and RUPA' provisions on
partnership ownership and transfer of property probably apply to limited
partnerships.
3. Provisions Relating to Limited Partners. The UPA has no provisions on
limited partners. Thus, the ULPA and RULPA provisions on admission,29
voting," information rights,3 and withdrawal32 of limited partners apply
exclusively. But even provisions that purport to relate only to limited partners
can raise linkage questions. ULPA and RULPA provisions on the "control
rule"33 and "erroneous" limited partners34 relate uncertainly to UPA and
RUPA provisions on estoppel and purported-partners. Participating in
control and participating as a limited partner without the appropriate
certificate-even if the participation falls within a "safe harbor" for control
liability3 6 or the partner complies with the statutory procedures for erroneous
26. RULPA § 208, 6 U.L.A. at 499 (Supp. 1995).
27. UPA § 8, 10, 6 U.L.A at 115, 155.
28. RUPA §§ 204, 302, 6 U.L.A. at 297, 300 (Supp. 1995). For discussions of differences between
the UPA and RUPA on these matters, see 1 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG
AND RiBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP §§ 3.02,4.04, at 3:2, 4:51 (Supp. 1994); Edward S. Merrill, Partnership
Property and Partnership Authority Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 49 BUS. LAW. 83
(1993).
29. ULPA § 8, 6 U.L.A. at 586; RULPA § 301, 6 U.L.A. at 438 (Supp. 1995).
30. RULPA § 302, 6 U.L.A. at 504 (Supp. 1995).
31. ULPA § 10, 6 U.L.A. at 590; RULPA § 305, 6 U.L.A. at 521 (Supp. 1995). Note that ULPA
§ 10 provides linkage regarding information rights by giving limited partners the same rights as general
partners.
32. ULPA § 16, 6 U.L.A. at 599; RULPA § 603, 6 U.L.A. at 554 (Supp. 1995).
33. ULPA § 7, 6 U.L.A. at 582; RULPA § 303, 6 U.L.A. at 505 (Supp. 1995).
34. ULPA § 11, 6 U.L.A. at 594; RULPA § 304, 6 U.L.A. at 518 (Supp. 1995).
35. UPA § 16, 6 U.L.A. at 195; RUPA § 308, 6 U.L.A. at 308 (Supp. 1995).
36. See RULPA § 303(b), 6 U.L.A. at 505 (Supp. 1995) (providing that participation in one or more
of listed activities does not constitute taking part in control).
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partners37-- could engender the sort of third-party reliance that creates estoppel
or purported-partner liability under the UPA and RUPA. If so, it is not clear
whether the general partnership or limited partnership provision applies.3"
4. Management and Voting Power of General and Limited Partners. Under
both the ULPA and RULPA, a general partner in a limited partnership has, at
least in the absence of contrary agreement, the rights, powers, duties, and
liabilities of a general partner in a general partnership.39 These provisions
imply that the UPA rule on per capita allocation of votes and its rules on the
number of votes necessary to reach a partner decision' apply to general
partnerships in the absence of contrary agreement. They also imply that general
partners of limited partnerships have the same power to bind the partnership
in ordinary matters as do general partners in general partnerships.
41
Since general partnerships have no limited partners, the limited partnership
statute arguably controls the allocation of power between general and limited
partners. The RULPA provision that the partnership agreement may grant
voting rights to limited partners 42 suggests that the limited partners have no
voting rights in the absence of contrary agreement. Yet there are several gaps
in limited partnership statutes that general partnership provisions may or may
not fill. The ULPA provision that a general partner may not perform
designated acts without the consent of all of the limited partners43 raises the
question whether the UPA fills the gap by providing for a majority vote of both
general and limited partners on other matters. 4 Also, the UPA provision that
requires all partners to consent to self-dealing45 would apply to limited
partnerships in the absence of a fiduciary duty provision in the limited
partnership statute. If so, RULPA's definition of "partner," which includes both
37. See id. § 304, 6 U.L.A. at 518 (providing that a limited partner who withdraws or causes an
appropriate certificate to be filed is not liable to third parties who thereafter transacts business with the
partnership).
38. See id. § 303(a), 6 U.L.A. at 505 (providing that a limited partner who participates in control
is liable only to persons who transact business with the limited partnership "reasonably believing" based
on partner's conduct that the partner is a general partner). The RULPA reliance test for control
liability further complicates this issue because it is similar but not identical to the reliance required for
purported-partner liability. RULPA Section 303(a) appears to require reliance on control activities,
while UPA § 16, 6 U.L.A. at 195, and RUPA § 308, 6 U.L.A. at 308 (Supp. 1995), require reliance on
any words or conduct by the purported partner or to which she consents. The RULPA test-reliance
on control-is either inconsistent with or simply deals with a different issue than the tests in general
partnership statutes: reliance on words or conduct generally.
39. See ULPA § 9, 6 U.L.A. at 586; RULPA § 403, 6 U.L.A. at 528 (Supp. 1995).
40. See UPA §§ 18(e), (g), (h), 6 U.L.A. at 213 (partners have equal votes; majority vote on
ordinary matters, unanimity on other matters; unanimity required for admission of partner).
41. See id. §§ 9-14, 6 U.L.A. at 132; RUPA §§ 301,302,305,6 U.L.A. at 299, 300,305 (Supp. 1995);
Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Cooper, 656 A.2d 215 (Conn. 1995)(holding that UPA provision that states
that a restriction on partner's authority binds third party who knows of it applies to general partners
in limited partnership).
42. RULPA § 302, 6 U.L.A. at 504 (Supp. 1995).
43. ULPA § 9, 6 U.L.A. at 586.
44. UPA § 18(h), 6 U.L.A. at 213; RUPA § 4010), 6 U.L.A. at 310 (Supp. 1995).
45. UPA § 21, 6 U.L.A. at 258.
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limited and general partners,' would arguably require approval of self-dealing
by both general and limited partners.47 On the other hand, if the UPA applies,
it would arguably provide only for a vote by general partners.
5. Transferability. The ULPA and RULPA49 include detailed provi-
sions on assignment of partnership interests. Because the ULPA applies only
to a limited partner's interest, the UPA applies to transfer of general partners'
interests. RULPA withdrawal provisions apply to general partners as well as
to limited partners, but they are generally consistent with the UPA in that both
provide that a partner's assignment can transfer only financial partner rights.50
6. Partners' Financial Rights and Duties. Limited partnership statutes
include creditor-protection provisions relating to the form of and return of
contributions and distributions that are unnecessary in general partnerships. The
ULPA provisions apply only to limited partners5' and therefore do not raise
any linkage issues. The RULPA provisions apply both to general partners and
to limited partners." These provisions apparently override UPA and RUPA
provisions permitting general partners to make capital contributions in any
form.53
Because the RULPA default rule of sharing by contributions applies both
to general and limited partners,54 RULPA arguably overrides general
partnership provisions for equal sharing of profits, losses, and distributions.
On the other hand, RULPA also provides that general partners who contribute
as limited partners are treated as limited partners to the extent of their
participation as such,56 implying that general partners are subject to rules
different than those applicable to limited partners. Indeed, in the absence of
contrary agreement, general partners who are personally liable probably would
expect to share on a different basis than would limited partners. For these
46. RUPA § 101(8), 6 U.L.A. at 285 (Supp. 1995).
47. The RULPA definition of "partnership agreement" as "any valid agreement, written or oral,
of the partners" implicitly supports the conclusion that an amendment to the partnership agreement
requires limited partner consent.
48. ULPA § 19, 6 U.L.A. at 603.
49. RULPA § 702, 6 U.L.A. at 563 (Supp. 1995).
50. See id. § 702, 6 U.L.A. at 563 (Supp. 1995); UPA § 27(1), 6 U.L.A. at 353. There is, however,
at least one difference between the provisions. RULPA § 702 provides that, "except as provided in the
partnership agreement, a partner ceases to be a partner upon assignment of all of his [or her]
partnership interest," while there is no equivalent provision in the UPA. In case of inconsistency,
RULPA, of course, applies. Although the law regarding transferability of limited partnership interests
may be clear, borrowing from general partnership law is questionable as a matter of policy, as discussed
in more detail below. See infra part IV.C.
51. See ULPA 88 15-17,6 U.L.A. at 174 (compensation of limited partner; withdrawal or reduction
of limited partner's contribution; liability for unpaid or returned contributions).
52. See RULPA §§ 501-02,607-08,6 U.L.A. at 544,559 (Supp. 1995) (form of contribution; liability
for contribution; limitations on distributions; liability on return of contribution).
53. UPA § 18(a), 6 U.L.A. at 213; RUPA § 401(a), 6 U.L.A. at 309 (Su'pp. 1995).
54. RULPA §§ 503-04, 6 U.L.A. at 549 (Supp. 1995) (profits and losses; sharing of distributions).
55. UPA § 18(a), 6 U.L.A. at 213; RUPA § 401(b), 6 U.L.A. at 309 (Supp. 1995).
56. RULPA § 404, 6 U.L.A. at 542 (Supp. 1995).
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reasons, the general partnership statutes may provide the default financial rights
for general partners in limited partnerships.
7. Fiduciary Duties and Remedies. The ULPA and RULPA do not
consider fiduciary duties but do provide that general partners in limited
partnerships have the rights, powers, duties, and liabilities of general partners
in general partnerships.57 It seems to follow that UPA and RUPA fiduciary
duty provisions" govern the fiduciary duties of general partners in limited
partnerships.59 There are, however, no provisions concerning fiduciary duties
of limited partners, which are covered neither by general nor limited partnership
acts.60
With regard to remedies, the ULPA is silent, and RULPA provides for
derivative suits. 61  It is not clear whether the UPA accounting remedy62
applies to limited partnerships, or whether that remedy is a prerequisite to other
relief, as is required in general partnerships.63 RULPA derivative suit
provisions strongly suggest that the accounting remedy is not the exclusive
remedy available to limited partners, but the impact of the derivative suit
provisions on general partner remedies is otherwise unclear. A recent case held
that a general partner of a limited partnership could not bring an action at law
against another general partner in the partnership's name without first obtaining
dissolution and accounting.' The court noted that RULPA gives a general
partner the same rights in a limited partnership as in a general partnership but
did not discuss the possible impact of RULPA derivative suit provisions.
8. Dissociation of General Partners and Dissolution. Linkage is perhaps
most confusing with regard to dissolution and dissociation of general partners.
ULPA and RULPA dissociation and dissolution provisions' apparently
override the UPA since both explicitly address the issue and are inconsistent
with the general partnership statutes. RULPA specifies events of withdrawal'
and requires written notice of voluntary withdrawal.67 RULPA also provides
that a withdrawing partner is entitled to receive distributions to which she is
entitled and, if not otherwise provided in the agreement, the fair value of her
57. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
58. UPA § 21, 6 U.L.A. at 258; RUPA § 404, 6 U.L.A. at 313 (Supp. 1995).
59. For a comparison of the UPA and the RUPA fiduciary duty provisions, see Larry E. Ribstein,
The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: Not Ready for Prime Time, 49 Bus. LAW. 45, 52-61 (1993).
60. For a discussion of fiduciary duties of limited partners, see infra part IV.E.
61. RULPA §§ 1001-04, 6 U.L.A. at 596 (Supp. 1995).
62. UPA § 22,6 U.L.A. at 529; see also RUPA § 405(b), 6 U.L.A. at 316 (Supp. 1995) (partner may
maintain action with or without an accounting).
63. See generally BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 28, § 6.08(c), at 6:98.
64. Dulles Comer Properties II Ltd. Partnership v. Smith, 431 S.E.2d 309 (Va. 1993).
65. ULPA §§ 20, 23, 6 U.L.A. at 604, 607 (retirement, death, or insanity of general partner;
distribution of assets); RULPA §§ 402,801-805,6 U.L.A. at 525,569 (Supp. 1995) (events of withdrawal
of general partner; dissolution, winding up, and distribution of assets).
66. RULPA § 402, 6 U.L.A. at 525 (Supp. 1995).
67. Id. § 602, 6 U.L.A. at 553 (Supp. 1995).
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interest." These provisions would appear to override analogous RUPA
provisions on events of withdrawal 69 as well as UPA7° and RUPA71 provi-
sions on distributions to withdrawing partners. However, there may be some
question about whether events of withdrawal provided for in RUPA but not in
RULPA apply to limited partnerships. 72
There are also differences between general and limited partnership law
regarding the causes of dissolution. Consider the following catalogue of causes.
UPA causes: (1) termination of the term or undertaking; (2) express
will, either with or without violation of the agreement; (3) expulsion; (4)
unlawfulness of the business or the members' participation; (5) death of
a member; (6) bankruptcy of a partner or the partnership; or (7) judicial
decree (a) of a partner's insanity, incapacity, wrongful conduct, or
breach, (b) that the business can only be carried on at a loss, (c) that
dissolution would be equitable under the circumstances, or (d) upon
application of an assignee in a partnership at will.73
RUPA causes: similar to UPA, except dissociation or express will of a
member does not necessarily dissolve the partnership.74
ULPA causes: retirement, death or insanity of a general partner.75
RULPA causes: (1) at the time specified in the certificate; (2) on an
event specified in writing in the partnership agreement; (3) on written
consent of all partners; (4) on a partner's event of withdrawal as
specified in the statute unless the other members agree to continue; or
(5) on judicial decree that it is "not reasonably practicable to carry on
the business in conformity with the partnership agreement. ,76
Despite coverage of dissolution and dissociation by the limited partnership
statutes, the question remains whether general partnership provisions apply to
specific dissolution and dissociation issues that the limited partnership statutes
do not cover. For example, the limited partnership acts do not make a partner's
express will a cause for dissolution. The RULPA provision on dissolution
causes appears to be inclusive, thus excluding UPA causes. But the RULPA
provision arguably only specifies dissolution causes that differ between limited
and general partnerships. Thus, while a general partner's withdrawal is treated
differently in limited partnerships than it is in general partnerships (because of
68. Id. § 604, 6 U.L.A. at 556 (Supp. 1995).
69. RUPA § 601, 6 U.L.A. at 322 (Supp. 1995).
70. UPA § 42, 6 U.L.A. at 521.
71. RUPA § 701, 6 U.L.A. at 328 (Supp. 1995).
72. These include the expulsion provisions. Id. § 601(4), (5), (7)(iii), 6 U.L.A. at 322.
73. UPA §§ 31-32, 6 U.L.A. at 376.
74. RUPA § 801, 6 U.L.A. at 335 (Supp. 1995).
75. ULPA § 20, 6 U.L.A. at 604.
76. RULPA §§ 801-02, 6 U.L.A. at 569 (Supp. 1995).
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the emphasis in the former on continuity), the UPA would still permit a general
partner to dissolve partnership by express will. The Official Comment to this
section, stating that it "merely collects in one place all of the events causing
dissolution,"" could mean that the section is all-inclusive. Alternatively, the
use of the word "merely" taken with the single RULPA dissolution provision,
as compared to ULPA dispersion of dissolution provisions in various sections,
could mean simply that RUPA collects limited partnership causes in one place,
while also preserving causes provided for in the general partnership statutes.
Other dissolution causes present similar questions. By applying the UPA"
where there was no ULPA provision for dissolution upon expiration of a term,
one court held that a ULPA limited partnership dissolved on expiration of a
twenty-year term.79 Another court applied the UPA provision permitting
judicial dissolution for losses,"° which is not a ULPA dissolution cause."s
There are analogous questions concerning dissolution consequences. While
the limited partnership acts provide mainly for distribution rights, 2 the UPA
provides in detail for other consequences of dissolution. 3 One court even
applied to a limited partnership the UPA provision on continuation of the
partnership for purposes of winding up.' The few courts that have addressed
the issue generally have refused to apply UPA consequences to limited partners.
One court refused to apply the UPA provision for a defrauded partner's lien 5
to a limited partner on the ground that the provision is intended to deal only
with personally liable general partners.8 6 Another refused to apply the UPA
post-dissolution profit-sharing provision 7 to a limited partner on the grounds
that a limited partner, unlike a general partner, has no exposure to continuing
liability and no property interest that is used in continuing the business.88 It
is less clear whether the UPA or RUPA should apply to general partners in
limited partnerships. Accordingly, the RULPA provision for distributions on
77. Id. § 801 cmt., 6 U.L.A. at 569.
78. See UPA § 31(1)(a), 6 U.L.A. at 376.
79. Lebanon Trotting Ass'n v. Battista, 306 N.E.2d 769 (Ohio Ct. App. 1972).
80. Cusano v. Cusano, 88 A.2d 342 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 91 A.2d 228 (N.J.
1952).
81. Note, however, that ULPA § 16(4), 6 U.L.A. at 600 (allowing a limited partner to have the
partnership dissolved if he unsuccessfully demands return of his contribution), arguably supplants UPA
§ 32(1)(e), 6 U.L.A. at 394 (providing for judicial dissolution when the business can only be carried on
at a loss).
82. ULPA § 23, 6 U.L.A. at 607; RULPA § 804, 6 U.L.A. at 576 (Supp. 1995); see also RULPA
§ 803, 6 U.L.A. at 574 (Supp. 1995) (winding up).
83. UPA §§ 30, 35-42, 6 U.L.A. at 367, 429 (continuation of partnership for winding up, effect on
partners' power to bind; effect on partners' existing liabilities, right to wind up, liquidation of
partnership, rights on dissolution for misrepresentation, distribution of assets, liability of persons
continuing the business, rights of withdrawn partners as against the continuing partnership).
84. Cheyenne Oil Corp. v. Oil & Gas Ventures, 204 A.2d 743 (Del. 1964).
85. UPA § 39, 6 U.L.A. at 467.
86. Central Allied Profit Sharing Trust v. Bailey, 759 P.2d 849 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
87. UPA § 42, 6 U.L.A. at 521.
88. Porter v. Barnhouse, 354 N.W.2d 227 (Iowa 1984). Contra Frye v. Manacare Ltd., 431 So.2d
181 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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withdrawal 9 may or may not supersede the UPA provision for profits-or-
interest election,' which RULPA does not specifically address.
9. Creditors' Rights. Under the UPA, general partners have either joint
or joint and several liability, depending on the type of obligation. 91 RUPA
provides not only for joint and several liability for all debts, but also insists that
creditors exhaust remedies against the partnership before levying execution
against an individual partner's assets.92 The UPA and RUPA also provide for
a charging order on behalf of creditors of individual partners.93 The limited
partnership acts do not provide for partnership liability, thereby apparently
deferring to general partnership law. The ULPA provides for a charging order
against limited partners' interests,94 deferring by implication to the UPA
regarding general partners. RULPA provides for a charging order against all
partners, 95 apparently precluding application of the UPA as to this remedy.
Other linkage issues with respect to creditors' remedies are less clear.
Because there is no equivalent limited partnership provision, the RUPA
exhaustion requirement may or may not extend to creditors' efforts to enforce
limited partners' obligations regarding returned contributions.96 The limited
partnership charging order remedy, while explicit, is incomplete and therefore
invites linkage. Neither the ULPA nor RULPA specifically provides for judicial
foreclosure of the charging order and assignment of the interest to the creditor.
There is conflicting authority regarding foreclosure on general partnership
interests in general partnerships. The UPA implies,97 and RUPA explicitly
provides,98 that foreclosure is available. But some cases decided under the
UPA have denied99 or limited"° foreclosure in general partnerships, and one
89. RULPA § 604, 6 U.L.A. at 556 (Supp. 1995).
90. UPA § 42, 6 U.L.A. at 521.
91. Id. § 15, 6 U.L.A. at 174. As discussed infra in Part V(A) many states' versions of the UPA
now include limited liability partnership ("LLP") provisions that modify or eliminate partners' liability.
Some of these states also permit limited partnerships to register as limited liability limited partnerships,
or LLLPs. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 6 §§ 1553, 17-214. The effect of LLP statutes on limited
partnerships in states that do not have LLLP provisions is unclear. LLP provisions are inconsistent with
limited partnership statutory provisions that apply to limited partners, and therefore would probably
not apply to limited partners under RULPA § 1105. But LLP provisions arguably should apply to
general partners in limited partnerships under provisions that give those partners the same rights as
general partners in general partnerships. See supra note 39.
92. RUPA § 307(d), 6 U.L.A. at 306 (Supp. 1995).
93. UPA § 28, 6 U.L.A. at 358; RUPA § 504, 6 U.L.A. at 321 (Supp. 1995).
94. ULPA § 22, 6 U.L.A. at 605.
95. RULPA § 703, 6 U.L.A. at 565 (Supp. 1995).
96. At least one case supports direct creditor action against limited partners on this theory. See
In re Sharps Run Assocs., 157 B.R. 766 (D.N.J. 1993).
97. See UPA §§ 28(1)-(2), 6 U.L.A. at 358 (providing for broad judicial powers in connection with
charging order; referring to redemption before foreclosure); Beckley v. Speaks, 240 N.Y.S.2d 553 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1963) (recognizing judicial sale of interest to third party), aff d, 251 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (N.Y. App.
Div.), app. dismissed, 202 N.E.2d 906 (N.Y. 1964).
98. RUPA § 504(b), 6 U.L.A. at 321 (Supp. 1995).
99. See Buckman v. Goldblatt, 314 N.E.2d 188 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974) (dictum) (stating UPA § 28(2)
must refer to foreclosure in support of a judgment against the partnership because otherwise it would
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state's version of the UPA prohibits foreclosure.' Some cases have restricted
foreclosure in limited partnerships as well.' °2
Whether the general partnership rules on foreclosure apply to limited
partnerships may depend on linkage of other provisions. The rules prohibiting
foreclosure against general partnerships arguably are justified on the ground
that a foreclosing creditor, as an assignee, could obtain judicial dissolution and
thereby threaten the continuity of the firm. 3 Since the ULPA and RULPA
do not explicitly permit assignees to force judicial dissolution,"° this reasoning
arguably does not apply to foreclosure on interests of either general or limited
partners in limited partnerships.0 5 Thus, the application of general partner-
ship foreclosure rules may turn on whether the assignee's power under the
UPA1° and RUPA °7 to obtain judicial foreclosure is linked to limited
partnerships. RULPA includes a specific provision on judicial dissolution that
provides only for a partner's right to obtain a decree,"° implying that RULPA
does not apply to this issue, so the UPA would apply. On the other hand,
RULPA's silence on assignees' rights in the context of a general provision on
conflict with UPA § 25(2)(c)).
100. See Hellman v. Anderson, 284 Cal. Rptr. 830 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a creditor can
foreclose on charged interest without the consent of co-partner unless co-partner satisfies the burden
of showing that foreclosure would unduly interfere with business, but noting that UPA permits
foreclosure); FDIC v. Birchwood Builders, 573 A.2d 182, 185 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div.) (ordering sale
of a partnership interest to a judgment creditor because the debtor partner failed to carry his burden
of showing that judgment would be satisfied without sale "in a reasonably expedient manner," and
reasoning that the court should be "circumspect" in ordering a sale, the creditor should not have to wait
for ultimate development of the property and that partners can avoid sale through redemption), cert.
denied, 585 A.2d 337 (N.J. 1990); City of New York v. Bencivenga, 169 N.Y.S.2d 515,519-20 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1955) (granting charging order and appointing receiver, but denying authority to sell charged
interest without prejudice to a later application "upon a showing of the necessity for such foreclosure").
101. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-8-28 (1994); see Larry E. Ribstein, An Analysis of Georgia's New
Partnership Law, 36 MERCER L. REV. 443, 490 (1985). This prohibition was recently held inapplicable
to a limited partnership interest. See Nigri v. Lotz, 453 S.E.2d 780 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
102. See In re Stocks, 110 B.R. 65 (N.D. Fla. 1989) (ruling that judgment creditor not entitled to
pursue levy and execution on stock of limited partnership interest where creditor had made no showing
whether assets would satisfy judgment in full); Centurion Corp. v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 255 Cal. Rptr.
794 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (ruling that court may authorize sale of judgment debtor's interest in limited
partnership where judgment creditor has obtained charging order, judgment remains unsatisfied, and
all other parties consent to sale). But see Madison Hills Ltd. Partnership II v. Madison Hills, Inc., 644
A.2d 363 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994)(charging creditors' remedies under UPA, including foreclosure, apply
to limited liability partnerships); Nigri v. Lotz, 453 S.E.2d 780.
103. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 28, § 3.05, at 3:73; J. Gordon Gose, The Charging
Order under the Uniform Partnership Act, 28 WASH. L. REV. 1, 16 (1953). But see J. Dennis Hynes,
The Charging Order: Conflicts Between Partners and Creditors, 25 PAC. L.J. 1 (1993) (arguing for
foreclosure).
104. See RULPA § 802,6 U.L.A. at 573 (Supp. 1995). There is no provision for judicial dissolution
in the ULPA.
105. A recent case so held as to foreclosure on a limited partner's interest. See Nigri, 453 S.E.2d
780.
106. UPA § 32(2), 6 U.L.A. 394.
107. RUPA § 801(6), 6 U.L.A. at 335 (Supp. 1995).
108. RULPA § 802, 6 U.L.A. at 573 (Supp. 1995).
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judicial decrees arguably means that an assignee of a partner in a limited
partnership has no right to obtain a decree."
10. Merger and Conversion. RUPA provides for conversion of general
partnerships into limited partnerships and vice versa,"' and for mergers of
general partnerships with limited partnerships."' These provisions suggest
that general partnership law controls mergers and conversions involving limited
partnerships.1 12 This ultimately could link the general partnership statute with
the limited partnership statute in certain respects despite specific limited
partnership provisions that otherwise would apply.
RUPA requires a general partnership that has converted to a limited
partnership to file a certificate that includes certain information about the
conversion." 3  Although the applicable limited partnership statute includes
specific formation provisions that otherwise would supersede RUPA, a court
nevertheless might decide that RUPA applies because RULPA has no merger
or conversion provisions. As such, the court might hold that the converted
limited partnership was not properly formed even if it complied with the
applicable limited partnership statute, unless the parties to the conversion also
complied with RUPA conversion provisions.
RUPA provides that a general partner who becomes a limited partner
continues to be liable as a general partner for some post-conversion liabilities
to third parties who reasonably believe that the limited partner is a general
partner.1 Thus, a limited partner may be liable under RUPA even if she has
fully complied with the conditions for limited liability under limited partnership
law.
RUPA requires a plan of merger1 5 that all of the partners must approve
if the limited partnership statute does not include merger provisions, even if
unanimity would not be required by the limited partnership agreement or
statute.11 6 It follows that a merger may have been validly approved under
limited partnership law but not under general partnership law.
RUPA prescribes the effects of conversions 7 and mergers.' 8 For exam-
109. For discussion of similar issues regarding the application of general partner provisions on
dissolution, see supra part II.B.8.
110. RUPA §§ 902-04, 6 U.L.A. at 344 (Supp. 1995).
111. Id. §§ 905-07, 6 U.L.A. at 347 (Supp. 1995).
112. Note that the confusion created by these provisions probably would exist even without overall
linkage between general and limited partnerships because courts still would have to decide whether the
merger provisions in the general partnership statute that explicitly apply to limited partnerships would
modify an existing limited partnership statute.
113. RUPA § 902(c), 6 U.L.A. at 345 (Supp. 1995).
114. Id § 902(e), 6 U.L.A. at 345. It is not clear whether this subsection provides for a different
standard of liability than that provided under the purported partner provision, itt § 308, 6 U.L.A. at
308, and, if so, whether the conversion provision would supersede the purported partner provision in
conversion situations.
115. Id. § 905(b), 6 U.L.A. at 347.
116. It § 905(c), 6 U.L.A. at 347.
117. Id. § 904, 6 U.L.A. at 346.
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pie, a partner of a party to the merger who does not become a partner of the
surviving entity has the rights of a dissociated partner under RUPA.119
However, under a limited partnership statute that does not include merger or
conversion provisions, the merger or conversion may be deemed to have the
effect of a dissolution on the partners' rights.
C. Alternative Approaches to Linkage
Linking the general and limited partnership statutes introduces so much
confusion into the law of limited partnership that linkage would have to be
fixed, even if it made theoretical sense, by more carefully defining when general
partnership law should apply The next part of this article considers the more
radical alternative of discarding the whole idea of linkage and redrafting the
limited partnership statute on a stand-alone basis. While the extensive change
inherent in delinking the statutes would involve potential costs, the poor fit
between general and limited partnership law justifies these costs.
III
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF LINKAGE
Resolving linkage issues requires balancing the benefits of linkage against
its costs. As described below, benefits of linkage include simplified drafting of
statutes, increased availability of judicial precedents, and greater tax and
regulatory benefits for limited partnerships. Costs of linkage include increased
information costs, decreased coherence of terms, and uncertain gap-filling by
courts.
A. Benefits of Linkage
1. Simplified Drafting of Statues. Linking standard forms economizes on
drafting by eliminating the need to draft provisions on all issues. However,
linkage still requires drafters to incur the cost of deciding which provisions
should be linked. Moreover, state legislators can economize on drafting without
linkage by borrowing provisions from uniform or model act proposals."2
2. Increased Availability of Judicial Precedents. Statutory standard
business forms generate customs, practices,21 and judicial precedents that
increase the clarity of contract terms by reducing errors of ambiguity,
inconsistency, and incompleteness. The value of these benefits depends on the
size of the current stock of precedents and other materials, as well as "network
118. Id. § 906, 6 U.L.A. at 348.
119. Id. § 906(e), 6 U.L.A. at 348.
120. See Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Uniform Laws, Model Laws and LLCs, 66 U.
COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 1995) (discussing functions of legislative proposals by promulgators of
uniform and model laws).
121. These include standard form agreements that are developed by law firms, bar groups, and
treatise writers for use under particular statutes.
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benefits" that will accrue in the future as a result of more people using the
standard form.1" These are important advantages of statutory standard forms
over less widely used private forms."2
Linking limited partnerships with general partnership law increases these
benefits of statutory terms by providing limited partnerships with a set of core
terms that are interpreted in the large number of cases involving general
partnerships. In other words, linkage produces a larger set of materials and
therefore more network benefits. For example, a separate limited partnership
statutory provision dealing with the fiduciary duties of general and limited
partners would generate cases only in disputes involving limited partnerships.
On the other hand, if the limited partnership statute were linked to the general
partnership provision, courts could apply cases involving both general and
limited partnership law to limited partnerships. These cases presumably would
cover a wider variety of fact situations and provide more decisions for each set
of facts. Although even without linkage such precedents might be available by
analogy, linking limited and general partnership statutes increases the predictive
power of precedents.
The benefits of linkage depend, then, on the value of the additional
interpretive materials that the linkage provides. The benefits depend partly on
the relative newness of the form. This suggests that linkage benefits may have
been greater for limited partnerships in their early history than they are now.
The benefits also depend on the need for clarity the materials provide. The
benefits may be small for narrow, specific rules, such as name and registration
requirements, which typically require little interpretation. Interpretive benefits
may be greater for more open-ended rules, such as those concerning fiduciary
duties. But this latter class of rules often involves case-by-case application in
idiosyncratic fact situations where precedents may have less value. Thus,
interpretive benefits of linkage may be valuable only for a relatively small
category of cases.
3. Greater Tax and Regulatory Benefits. The history of limited partnership
statutes indicates that linkage with general partnership is due partly to
regulatory and tax considerations rather than to contracting costs. The first
limited partnership statutes in this country124 were adopted at a time when
partnership rules held anyone with an interest in the profits of a business liable
122. For a general discussion of network benefits, see Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network
Externalities, Competition and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985). This concept was applied
to business association statutes in Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of
Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757(1995). I am indebted to Michael Klausner for this distinction between
the value of a network and that of an existing stock of interpretive materials.
123. See Larry E. Ribstein, Statutory Forms for Closely Held Firms: Theories and Evidence from
LLCs, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 369 (1995).
124. These were modeled on the New York law, adopted in 1822. See ULPA § 1 cmt., 6 U.L.A. at
563.
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for its debts." s The limited partnership was created as a narrow exception to
the general rule that one could obtain limited liability only by obtaining a state-
conferred right to incorporate.12 6  Linking limited liability to the widely
accepted partnership form reduced the suspicion with which lawmakers regarded
the limited partnership.
Even after corporate limited liability became readily obtainable, linking
limited and general partnerships remained expedient because of tax laws.127
Tax laws have long distinguished between partnership "aggregates" and
corporate "entities," imposing extra burdens on the corporate form.' 28
Classifying a business as a partnership or corporation determines whether it is
taxed on a "flow-through" basis-with income and losses attributed to partners'
tax liabilities'g--or is instead treated as a separate taxpaying entity. A firm
is taxed as a partnership under Subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code if
it is not a "corporation," a term defined to include "association."" Whether
a firm is an "association" depends on its "resemblance" to a corporation."'
The regulations provide that a business organization is a corporation if it more
closely resembles a corporation than a partnership based on several factors:
continuity of life, centralized management, limited liability, and free transferabil-
ity of interests. 32 In characterizing limited partnerships as partnerships rather
than corporations for tax purposes, the regulations emphasize their "partner-
ship" features, including personal liability of the general partners and
management by owners.133
More recently, it has become possible to obtain limited liability and
partnership tax treatment through the LLC1  and the LLP.lss  These busi-
ness forms include the regulatory and tax advantages formerly unique to the
limited partnership form. In fact, the limited partnership form now may be a
liability for some regulatory purposes because it lacks the important partnership
attribute of decentralized management. In particular, limited partnership
125. See Waugh v. Carver, 2 H. BI. 235, 126 Eng. Rep. 525 (C.P. 1793).
126. Cf. J. WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BuSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970, at 26 (1970) (noting that "tradition assigns as a prime... inducement
to use of the corporation the limited liability of shareholders").
127. For a general discussion and critique of the influence of tax law on business form, see Larry
E. Ribstein, The Deregulation of Limited Liability and the Death of Partnership, 70 WASH. U. L. Q..417
(1992).
128. For criticism of the distinction between corporations and partnerships in the tax law, see id. at
451-56.
129. See I.R.C. § 701 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (stating partnerships not subject to taxes; partners liable
for taxes in individual capacities).
130. See id § 7701(a)(2)-(3) (defining "partnership" and "corporation").
131. Morrissey v. Comm'r, 296 U.S. 344, 357 (1935).
132. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-02(a) (as amended in 1995). For leading cases interpreting these
regulations, see Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Larson v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 159
(1976).
133. See Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-1 C.B. 798.
134. See infra part V.B.
135. See infra part V.A.
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interests are more likely than LLC interests to be regulated under the securities
laws.136
B. Costs of Linkage
A significant cost of linking general and limited partnership law is that
linkage creates much confusion and uncertainty regarding which rules apply to
certain matters. These costs could be reduced by more clearly delineating when
general partnership rules apply to limited partnerships. However, such
clarification may eliminate some of the benefits of linkage by increasing drafting
costs and by making the overall linkage between general and limited partnership
too narrow to justify treating the two forms similarly for regulatory and tax
purposes. Moreover, even if linkage were adequately clarified, certain inherent
costs of linkage would remain. In general, linkage interferes with basic
functions of statutory standard forms, including informing the parties what rules
apply, and providing coherent sets of rules and guiding courts in filling gaps.137
1. Increased Information Costs. Statutory standard forms provide firms
with clear sets of ground rules. Even the clearest linkage rules increase a
party's costs by forcing the party to check two or more statutes.
2. Decreased Coherence of Terms. The value of standard forms depends
on whether they offer efficient default structures that minimize the need for
customized selection of terms. If most firms that adopt term "A" would want
to adopt term "B," the statutes should provide this combination rather than
forcing firms to write customized contracts. In other words, the statute should
be "coherent" in the sense that it offers combinations of terms that suit the
needs of most of the firms likely to select the standard form. Constructing a
coherent set of default terms involves trade-offs at the margin. For example,
it is inefficient to combine two or more costly monitoring devices where the
marginal cost of each additional device exceeds its marginal benefit.
Combining limited and general partnership terms may violate the coherence
objective because terms that suit a business form with centralized management
in which only the managers are personally liable may differ from terms that are
appropriate for decentralized-management firms in which all members are
personally liable. For example, managers arguably should be subject to stricter
fiduciary constraints on self-dealing and negligence in centralized-management
firms than in firms in which all members participate directly in management and
therefore supervise their co-owners. Fiduciary duties provide post hoc
monitoring through litigation, which can be excessively costly if the members
136. See Larry E. Ribstein, Form and Substance in the Definition of a "Security": The Case of
Limited Liability Companies, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 807 (1994) (arguing that LLC interests should
not be characterized as securities).
137. For a more extended analysis of the function of the statutory standard forms on which much
of the discussion in this section is based, see Ribstein, supra note 123.
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also are monitoring contemporaneously through their involvement in manage-
ment. Linkage nevertheless encourages courts to apply the fiduciary duties to
general partners in both types of partnerships.
3. Uncertain Gap-Filling by Courts. Embodying a business form in a
separate statute guides a court in deciding cases for which neither a statute nor
a firm's customized contract clearly provides. For example, by choosing to form
a "partnership," a firm signals that in the absence of contrary agreement, all
members participate equally in management. Accordingly, in a firm that adopts
the partnership form but agrees to "corporate-type" centralized management by
a managing partner, the manager has only such power to override the members
as the agreement expressly provides. Conversely, the manager of a firm that
adopts the corporate form but agrees to "partnership-type" decentralized
management has a default power to manage that must be explicitly overridden
by the agreement. In this way, identically drafted agreements may mean
different things in different organizational forms.
Linkage may interfere with the gap-filling functions of standard forms by
creating uncertainty as to whether ambiguous terms in partnership agreements
should be interpreted consistently with the general partnership model of
decentralized management and member liability, or with the limited partnership
model of centralized management and limited liability of nonmanagers.
Uncertainties about how to fill gaps in statutes may cause interpretation
problems that offset any interpretive benefits that linkage provides by enlarging
the scope of available case law.
4. Application to Limited Partnerships. Because of the regulatory and tax
origins of the limited partnership,138 it has only recently been possible to
develop a clear and testable theory of the transaction costs of the limited
partnership standard form. I have previously discussed how limited partnerships
are usefully differentiated both from general partnerships (the limited liability
of the limited partners) and from corporations (the personal liability of the
general partners).139 While each of these features offers potential advantages
for some types of firms, there remains the question why a firm would want to
combine limited and personal liability rather than form either a general
partnership or a corporation. My earlier article focused on how the general
partners' personal liability helps align them with creditors' interests, thereby
mitigating the agency costs of debt inherent in limited liability.'4°
The general partners' personal liability does not, however, fully explain the
limited partnership "control rule," which makes limited partners liable as
general partners for taking part in the control of the business.141 This rule
138. See supra part III.A.3.
139. See Ribstein, supra note 5, at 841-63.
140. Id. at 847-48.
141. See ULPA § 7, 6 U.L.A. at 582; RULPA § 303, 6 U.L.A. at 505 (Supp. 1995).
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does not ensure that management powers are exercised only by those who are
personally liable for the firm's debts, since the rule does not prevent anyone but
the limited partners from exercising control.142 Instead, the control rule
operates to prevent owners from exercising the usual power of residual
claimants to take over management responsibilities.
Enforced owner passivity serves two purposes. First, it protects creditors by
assuring them that limited-liability owners in insolvent firms will not initiate or
approve transactions by removing general partners, by amending the agreement,
or in collusion with insolvent or thinly capitalized general partners. Such actions
would likely be contrary to the creditors' interests because the limited partners
can gain from gambles that pay off while having nothing to lose from those that
do not.4 3 The control rule ensures that those who exercise control have
incentives to consider creditors' interests. In some contexts, this rule will work
better than both turning control over to creditors, which could create perverse
incentives vis-A-vis residual claimants, or simply leaving it to managers to
balance incompatible creditor and owner interests.144
Second, the control rule protects general partners. By prohibiting limited
partners from ousting a general partner as the firm approaches insolvency, the
rule assures general partners that they will not be exposed involuntarily to
burdensome personal liability. Also, the control rule allows the limited
partnership form to be used to effectuate an "estate freeze" in which an owner-
manager of a family-controlled business can retain control while distributing
financial interests in the firm to family members.45
This analysis suggests that there is a transaction cost justification for limited
partnerships as a business form separate from general partnerships. This
explanation could be tested empirically by determining what types of firms are
organized as limited partnerships after the rise of both the LLC and the LLP
has eliminated the initial tax and regulatory reasons for adopting the limited
partnership form.
Because the enforced passivity of limited partners is a distinguishing
characteristic of limited partnerships, it should be taken into account when
drafting other provisions of the limited partnership statute. In other words, the
statute is coherent only if all of its provisions suit a firm whose nonmanaging
142. See Ribstein, supra note 5, at 885.
143. For a good illustration of this problem, see Chancellor Allen's opinion in Credit Lyonnais Bank
Nederland v. Pathe Communications Corp. (Del. Ch.1991), reprinted in 17 DEL J. CORP. L. 1099, 1154-
57 (1992).
144. The problems of these alternatives in the corporate context are illustrated by Credit Lyonnais
Bank Nederland v. Pathe Communications Corp., in which the board was held not to have breached
its duty to the shareholder by refusing to sell assets. See id. For a criticism of this decision, see C.
Robert Morris, Directors' Duties in Nearly Insolvent Corporations: A Comment on Credit Lyonnais,
19 J. CORP. L. 61, 67 (1993) (noting that fiduciary principles do not work well in this instance because
of the difficulty of balancing conflicting interests).
145. See S. Stacy Eastland, Valuation Planning With Respect To Transfers Of Partnership Interests
Under Chapter 14; Transfer Tax Consequences Of Selected Partnership Structures, 1 ALI-ABA COURSE
OF STUDY: PLANNING TECHNIQUES FOR LARGE ESTATE 109, 172-75 (1993).
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members have contracted for enforced passivity. Moreover, the statute should
signal courts to fill gaps in contracts and in the statute consistently with this
principle of enforced passive ownership. Conversely, general partnership
provisions that are designed for coequal and active owners are not well suited
for limited partnerships and should be delinked from limited partnership law.
C. Summary
The foregoing analysis suggests that linking general and limited partnerships
has some benefits, such as increasing the stock of legal precedents that can be
used to interpret limited partnership terms and tying limited'and general
partnerships together for tax and regulatory purposes. The benefits of
additional case law, however, are unclear because many statutory terms are
specific enough to need little interpretation, and courts often face idiosyncratic
facts. The regulatory and tax benefits of linking general and limited partner-
ships also may be small in light of parties' ability to obtain these benefits by
forming LLCs or LLPs. Thus, the benefits of linkage are outweighed by the
costs of inappropriately combining two disparate standard forms: incoherence;
increased information costs; and erroneous gap-filling.
It follows that limited partnership statutes should be revised to stand alone
rather than to incorporate terms of the general partnership statute." Thus,
the rest of this article will provide specific guidance as to how delinkage could
be accomplished.
IV
A GUIDE TO DELINKING LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS
This part analyzes issues raised by delinking the limited and general
partnership statutes, as recommended in part III, and makes specific suggestions
for drafting a delinked limited partnership statute.
A. Formalities of Organization and Purported Partners
Formalities in limited and general partnerships differ significantly. The
limited partnership certificate discloses to third parties the nature of the business
form and the identity of personally liable managers. 47 Because general
partnerships have nothing comparable to a limited partnership certificate,"
the two types of firms should differ regarding the role of nonrecord representa-
146. Although delinkage would be efficient, changing the law by delinking the statutes might impose
significant costs on existing businesses by retroactively changing the default terms of parties' contracts.
Accordingly, delinkage should not apply to existing limited partnerships unless the partnerships have
agreed to apply the new law. In any event, retroactive changes of corporate contracts may be
unconstitutional. See generally Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, The Contract Clause and the
Corporation, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 767 (1989) (arguing that the Constitution's contract clause mandates
minimal state intrusion in corporate contracts).
147. See Ribstein, supra note 5, at 877-80.
148. This is changing with the advent of the LLP. See infra part V.A.
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tions of partnership. In order to reduce investigation and litigation costs, a
person whom the certificate lists as a general partner should be liable as such
even if that person has not been represented as a general partner apart from the
certificate. Conversely, a third party who is on notice that she is dealing with
a limited partnership should not be able to recover partnership debts from a
person who was not listed as a general partner in the certificate, irrespective of
noncertificate representations. In short, the delinked limited partnership statute
should not apply the general-partnership purported-partner rule since it would
lead to different results.49
In order to avoid possible conflicts between recorded documents, the limited
partnership certificate should be the sole repository of record information about
the partnership, including statements concerning the authority and status of the
general partners. Accordingly, separate statements of authority and dissociation
provided for under RUPA'" should not apply to limited partnerships. For
example, a person who continues to be listed in a limited partnership certificate
as a general partner should continue to have the status of a general partner as
to third parties even if she has dissociated and a RUPA "statement of
dissociation" has been filed.151
B. Partners' Management Power
Because limited partners' passivity is a critical feature of the limited
partnership form, partner management power is probably the most important
linkage issue. Given the passivity of limited partners, third parties would expect
general partners to have greater power to manage a limited partnership vis-A-vis
the limited partners than has each general partner vis-t-vis her co-partners in
a general partnership. A general partner therefore should be able to take all
but the most extraordinary actions on behalf of a partnership without limited
partner approval. Indeed, limited partnership cases tend to restrict a general
partner's power to bind the firm mainly when a third party has specific reason
to know that a general partner's act was unauthorized.152 Accordingly, limited
partnership statutes should be revised to eliminate potential confusion from
149. See Ribstein, supra note 5, at 878 n.153.
150. See supra part II.B.1.
151. See RUPA § 704, 6 U.L.A. at 333 (Supp. 1995). There is some question whether either a
certificate disclosure or a statement of dissociation should bind a third party regarding a partner's
dissociation since this would require third parties continually to check the record. See Ribstein, supra
note 5, at 878 (discussing certificate disclosure); Ribstein, supra note 59, at 48 (discussing statement of
dissociation).
152. See In re Fox Hill Office Investors, 926 F.2d 752 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that limited
partnership was not bound by loan because partner's broad authority was limited by restrictions
regarding recourse loans and commingling); Anchor Centre Partners v. Mercantile Bank, 803 S.W.2d
23 (Mo. 1991) (holding that limited partnerships not bound by loan where creditor knew from the
partnership agreement that the partners' consent was required for an assignment of assets as security
for nonpartnership debt); Green River Assocs. v. Mark Twain Kansas City Bank, 808 S.W.2d 894 (Mo.
App. 1991) (holding that since bank knew partnership agreement required deposit of proceeds of loan
in partnership account, it could not rely on apparent authority of general partner to deposit proceeds
elsewhere, so partnership was not liable for repayment of misappropriated proceeds).
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linkage by clarifying which acts of a general partner require limited partner
consent. 15
C. Transferability
Both limited and general partnership statutes restrict the transfer of manage-
ment rights.1 54 This suggests that general partnership precedents on this point
should apply to limited partnerships. Yet applying general partnership
precedents to transfers by limited partners seems inappropriate at first blush
because limited partners' passivity both increases their need for an exit option
and decreases their need to veto new limited partners. 55 Accordingly, the
restrictions appear intended only to prevent the firm from having the corporate
tax feature of free transferability.
On the other hand, there may be a nontax justification for a default rule
restricting transferability of limited partners' management rights. Such a rule
provides an alternative both to corporations, which provide for free transferabil-
ity of passive interests, and to partnerships and LLCs, which restrict transferabil-
ity for active owners. In particular, restricting transferability of limited partners'
management rights accommodates the use of limited partnerships as devices for
locking in control and membership in family firms.'56
The delinked limited partnership should therefore provide for restricted
transferability of limited partner management rights. Although the parties could
agree to restrict transferability under a default rule of free transferability,
creating a default rule against transferability signals that ambiguities in
agreements should be interpreted consistently with a standard form of restricted
transferability.
D. Partners' Financial Rights and Duties
The general partnership rule of equal sharing of financial rights should not
apply to limited partnerships.'57 Given the different roles of and risks to
general and limited partners, the two classes of interests should not share
equally. Furthermore, the two classes should not be treated the same under a
limited partnership default rule of sharing according to contributions.5 8 In the
unlikely situation that there is no express agreement, the parties probably would
expect the general partners to receive something in return for their contribu-
tions of management and credit. Yet a default rule of equal sharing among
general partners and sharing by contributions among limited partners leaves
unclear the total shares of each class of partners.
153. A good starting place is the list of general partner acts that require limited partner consent,
except for the outmoded reference to confessions of judgment. See e.g. ULPA § 9, 6 U.L.A. at 586.
154. See supra part II.B.5.
155. See Ribstein, supra note 5, at 892-93.
156. See supra text accompanying note 145.
157. See supra part II.B.6.
158. See RULPA § 503, 6 U.L.A. at 549 (Supp. 1995).
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The best solution may be for the statute to provide by default, on the one
hand, for aggregate financial rights equally split between general partners and
limited partners, and, on the other hand, for per capita and pro rata sharing
rules, respectively, within each of these classes. Although this rule may be
unsuitable for many partnerships, it remains a better default rule than one that
does not distinguish between general and limited partnership interests.
.E. Fiduciary Duties and Remedies
General partnership fiduciary duties are inappropriate in limited partner-
ships. Because of limited partners' enforced passivity and the conflicts inherent
in the differing interests of limited liability and personally liable members,
limited partnerships have a greater need for rules restricting self-interested
conduct by managers. Accordingly, applying the same level of stringent
fiduciary duties in the two contexts violates the coherence objective of statutory
standard forms."5 9 Despite the current rules linking general and limited
partnerships, the courts now characterize general partners in limited partner-
ships for fiduciary duty purposes more as corporate directors than as part-
ners.
160
Linkage also creates problems regarding limited partners' duties. General
partners' fiduciary duties clearly should not apply to limited partners, given the
latters' enforced passivity. But limited partners arguably should have a duty not
to abuse their limited veto power by selfishly acting contrary to the general
partners' interests. For example, limited partners of financially strapped firms
could block asset sales that would forestall bankruptcy and, in turn, a large
personal liability for the general partners, preferring instead to "roll the dice"
given their own limited stakes in the firm.16 1 On the other hand, since limited
partners have no managerial responsibilities, perhaps limited partners should be
no more subject to default fiduciary duties than are ordinary creditors. 62 The
parties could protect against opportunistic use of the limited partners' veto
power by specific contractual provisions.
With respect to remedies, UPA accounting should not be the exclusive
remedy in limited partnerships. This remedy may be appropriate to deal with
159. Indeed, fiduciary duties in the traditional sense of constraints on managers may be
inappropriate in general partnerships. See Ribstein, supra note 59, at 54.
160. See Wyler v. Feuer, 149 Cal. Rptr. 626 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Trustees of Gen. Elec. Pension
Trust v. Levenson, 18 DEL J. CORP. L. 364, 370-71 (Del. Ch. 1992). The corporate director analogy also
is suspect. Fiduciary duties may be less necessary in limited partnerships than in corporations to
constrain managers' actions that are careless or not strongly self-benefitting because general partners
are motivated to act in the firm's interests by their ownership interests and (at least where the partner
is an individual) their personal liability.
161. See KE Property Management, Inc. v. 275 Madison Management Corp., 19 DEL. J. CORP. L.
364, 370-71 (Del. Ch. 1993) (holding that in exercising power to remove general partner, limited partner
resisting bankruptcy may have had duty not to act to detriment of general partner and other partners,
but finding that removal for fraud was permitted by partnership agreement).
162. See, e.g., Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2 v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990)
(holding that lender had no fiduciary duty to borrower).
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the complex litigation that can arise out of cross-claims between partners.163
But this complexity is less likely to be a problem in limited partnerships, which
typically have only one or two general partners, and the limited partners of
which are unlikely to have contribution obligations that give rise to cross-claims.
E General Partner Dissociation and Dissolution
General partnership law regarding general partner dissociation and
dissolution should not be applied to limited partnerships because of the many
relevant differences between the two forms of business. With regard to
dissociation, general partner exit should be restricted more in limited than in
general partnerships. Although general partners' exposure to liability justifies
giving them a default exit right in both types of firms, the costs to the
partnership stemming from general partner withdrawal are likely to be greater
in a limited partnership because the limited partners necessarily rely on the
general partner's managerial skills. Moreover, the potential costs to the general
partner of restricting her exit are likely to be less in limited than in general
partnerships because the limited partners' enforced passivity makes it less likely
they will opportunistically take advantage of a frozen-in partner."6 Accord-
ingly, limited partnership statutes should at least provide for a default notice
period prior to dissociation, and they should expressly permit agreements that
wholly bar dissociation.
With respect to dissolution, given the general partner's managerial role in
limited partnerships, limited partnership statutes should continue to provide for
dissolution on withdrawal of a general partner, 165 at least where the partner's
withdrawal occurs after the completion of an agreed term or undertaking."6
As in RULPA, the partners should be able to provide in the agreement for
continuation of the partnership and, in the absence of an agreement, to vote to
continue the partnership upon the dissociation of a general partner. However,
the statute should not require by default that the limited partners vote
unanimously to continue the partnership. The limited partners have less need
than do general partners to be able to veto the continuation of the partnership
after a general partner's withdrawal. Nor are limited liability passive owners
ordinarily concerned about continuing liabilities or their ability to work with
new management. Moreover, the limited partnership provisions should apply
to the exclusion of those in the general partnership statute, absent contrary
163. See 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 28, § 6.08(c), at 6:100-:102.
164. The appropriate rules on dissociation may also depend on whether the general partner is
incorporated. But since incorporation, however common, is not part of the standard form, there is a
weaker basis for coordinating this feature with other rules that are part of the standard form. The
control rule arguably serves to lock passive members out of management whether or not the general
partner has personal liability.
165. See RULPA § 801, 6 U.L.A. at 569 (Supp. 1995).
166. This is also similar to RUPA § 801(2)(i), 6 U.L.A. at 335 (Supp. 1995), which provides for
dissolution unless the partnership is continued by the vote of a majority in interest of members after
the partner's dissociation from the partnership for a term.
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agreement. Among other things, exclusivity would prevent a general partner
from making an end-run around restrictions on withdrawal by dissolving the
partnership by express will pursuant to the general partnership statute.'67
With regard to the consequences of dissolution, there is no reason for
distinguishing general partners in general partnerships from general partners in
limited partnerships. The statute should, however, clarify the distinct
consequences of dissolution for limited partners. For example, the profits-or-
interest election,1" which is designed specifically for general partners, should
not apply to limited partners.
G. Creditors' Rights
Creditors should have the same rights against a limited partnership and its
general partners as they have against a general partnership. However, the
limited partnership statute should provide for these rights separately to clarify
creditors' rights against limited partners. In particular, creditors of individual
limited partners should be readily able to foreclose on partnership interests,
because such foreclosure poses no risk to the management or continuity of the
partnership.1 69
H. Merger and Conversion
Merger and conversion provisions raise potential linkage problems to the
extent that they permit combinations between limited partnerships and other
business entities, including general partnerships. Rules on governance,
formalities, and member liability in the various corporate and partnership
statutes should be coordinated. 7 ° For example, the general partnership
statute should not prescribe a limited partnership merger vote different from the
vote required for comparable actions by the limited partnership statute.
Another potential linkage problem in merger and conversion concerns the
limited partnership control rule. Because the control rule is intended to protect
creditors from actions by owners,' the owners should not be able to escape
these restrictions unilaterally by merging a limited partnership into a limited
liability firm, such as an LLC, which is not subject to the control rule,1 72
without the sort of creditor payoff that would occur in a dissolution.
167. Nevertheless, the partners should be able to provide for other causes of dissolution in their
agreement, including dissolution by express will of the partners.
168. See UPA § 42, 6 U.L.A. at 521.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 103-09.
170. See supra part II.B.10. One way to provide this coordination is through "cross-entity" merger
provisions such as those recently adopted in Kansas. See 1995 Kan. Sess. Laws 336, enacted May 7,
1995.
171. See supra text accompanying note 144.
172. The same principle applies to merger with limited partnerships formed under the Georgia
statute, which does not include the control rule. See GA. CODE ANN. § 14-9-303 (1994). However, this
problem does not apply to combinations with general partnerships, in which members have personal
liability whether or not they participate in control.
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OTHER APPLICATIONS OF LINKAGE
This part looks broadly at other linkages in business association statutes.
The analysis distinguishes three variations on linkage between general and
limited partnerships. Part A discusses the explicit linkage of general partner-
ships and LLPs. Part B discusses implicit linkage that results from using
language from one type of business association statute in a statute that applies
to another type of business association. Part C discusses implicit delinkage,
where a nonstandard type of firm such as a close corporation or centrally
managed partnership may be treated differently from a standard firm organized
under the same statute. Although these variations on linkage involve basic
policy considerations similar to those applying to limited partnerships, they raise
somewhat different issues because of differences in the specificity and appropri-
ateness of linkage.
A. Explicit Linkage: General Partnerships and LLPs
LLP provisions are terms of the general partnership statute that allow
partners to limit their liability, generally for co-partner negligence only,
provided that they comply with requirements regarding insurance, name, and
central filing.173
173. LLP statutes included the following as of the early summer of 1995: S.B. 1012, 41st Leg., 2d
Sess., 1994 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 566 (West), available in Westlaw, AZ-LEGIS94 File; S.S.B. 360, 1994 Leg.,
Feb. Sess., 1994 Conn. Legis. Serv. 859 (West), available in Westlaw, CT-LEGIS94 File; S.B. 161,137th
Gen. Assembly, 1993-94 Sess., 1993 Del. Laws, available in Westlaw, DE-LEGIS93 File; Act. 10-66,
1993-94 Council Sess.. 1993 D.C. Reg. 5764, available in Westlaw, DC-LEGIS93 File; H.B. 199, 1995
Ga. Laws, available in Westlaw, GA-LEGIS File; S.B. 1448, 88th Gen. Assembly, 1993-94 Sess., 1994
I1l. Legis. Serv. 1454 (West), available in LEXIS, STATES Library, ILTEXT File; H.F. 2280, 75th Gen.
Assembly, 2d Sess., 194 Iowa Legis Serv. 1454 (West), available in Westlaw, IA-LEGIS94 File; S.B. 582,
75th Leg., 1993-94 Sess., 1994 Kan. Sess. Laws, available in LEXIS, STATES Library, KSTEXT File;
S.B. 184, 1994 Leg., Regular Sess., §§ 97-106, 1994 Ky. Acts, available in Westlaw, KY-LEGIS94 File;
S.B. 513, 1994 Gen. Assembly, Regular Sess., 1994 Md. Laws, available in Westlaw, MD-LEGIS94 File;
H.B. 5593, 87th Leg., 1994 Sess., available in LEXIS, STATES Library, MITEXT File; H.F. 1985, 78th
Leg., 1994 Sess., 1994 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. (West), available in Westlaw, MN-LEGIS94 File; S.751 1-A,
A. 11317-A, 217th Leg. §§ 6-15, 1994 N.Y. Laws, available in Westlaw, NY-LEGIS94 File; H.B. 923,
1993 Gen. Assembly, Regular Sess. art. 3a, 1993 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 499, available in Westlaw, NC-
LEGIS93 File; S.B. 74, 120th Gen. Assembly, 1993-94 Sess., 1994 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-165 (Baldwin),
available in LEXIS, STATES Library, OHTEXT File; S.B. 1059, 178th Gen. Assembly, 1993-94 Sess.,
1994 Pa. Legis. Serv. 523 (Purdon), available in LEXIS, STATES Library, PATEXT File; H.B. 4283,
Gen. Assembly, Regular Sess., 1994 S.C. Acts, available in Westlaw, SC-LEGIS94 File; H.B. 1252, 1995
S.D. Laws, available in SD-LEGIS File; H.B. 273, 73d Leg., 1993 Sess., 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3891
(Vernon), available in LEXIS, STATES Library, TXTEXT File; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-1-41 to -48
(Supp. 1994). All of the statutes provide that a partner is liable for her own negligence and for
participating in or failing adequately to monitor co-partner negligence. They all also provide that the
limitation of liability does not apply to debts incurred prior to registration. A few of these statutes
provide that partners have limited liability for all types of liabilities. See H.B. 199, 1995 Ga. Laws,
available in Westlaw, GA-LEGIS File; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 323.14 (West 1981 & Supp. 1995); N.Y.
PARTNERSHIP LAW § 26 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1995); H.B. 1252, 1995 S.D. Laws, available in SD-
LEGIS File. For a complete and current discussion of LLP statutes, see ALAN R. BROMBERG &
LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS AND THE
LINKING STATUTORY FORMS
LLPs are explicitly linked to other types of general partnerships in the sense
that, except as specifically provided in the statutes, general partnership law
applies to LLPs. The linkage with general partnership law is stronger than for
limited partnerships because LLP provisions are part of the general partnership
statutes and do not include separate operational provisions regarding such issues
as management, transfer, dissolution, fiduciary duties, and economic rights,
which apply specifically to LLPs.
Linkage in LLPs may have the advantage of helping firms adopt limited
liability without having to leave behind the helpful body of partnership law and
custom. This may encourage more firms to become LLPs, which, in turn, may
generate still more customs and precedents. Yet linkage in the LLP context
also violates the coherence and gap-filling objectives of standard forms174 by
combining limited liability with partnership default rules that are designed for
personally liable owners. For example, because of their limited liability, LLP
partners, unlike conventional partners, arguably should have a weaker default
power to participate in management and to exit than do partners in non-LLPs.
These considerations suggest that LLPs should be governed by distinct statutes
designed to accommodate the combination of limited liability and partnership-
type management.
Whether or not linkage in LLPs is justified, the LLP form may have
transaction-cost and regulatory benefits that offset the costs of erroneous
linkage. These benefits include allowing existing firms to adopt limited liability
without having to incur all of the costs of converting to a completely new form
of business, helping ensure that the firms remain partnerships for purposes of
applying tax and regulatory statutes.'75 For these reasons, LLPs may prefer
to adopt the full set of partnership features even if these features are not fully
coherent with limited liability. Delinking LLPs from general partnerships might
therefore deny firms a useful contract form.
REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT (1995).
174. See supra parts III.B.2-3.
175. See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Possible Futures for Unincorporated Firms, U. CIN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1995) (reviewing transaction cost and regulatory advantages of LLPs).
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TABLE 1: LLC BORROWING FROM OTHER STATUTES
No. adopting



















Assignee's right to become
member
Rights of members' creditors
Estate's power




Member right to withdraw
a. Limited partner provision




Consent to continuation after
member dissociation
Distributions on dissolution
Participation in winding up
Foreign registration required
Internal affairs







No actions as LLC until compliance with formal-
ities
Procedures for paying claims
List of activities that are not transacting business
Filing of certificate or substantial compliance
with requirements
May be in any form
Compromise does not affect intervening creditor
Agreement controls time of distribution prior to
withdrawal or dissolution
Restricting right to receive non-cash distribution
Defined as personal property, includes only
financial rights, and is assignable
Assignee liable only when becomes member,
then only for known obligations
Assignor no longer member after assignment of
all of interest
Assignor retains liabilities
On member consent or as agreed
Partnership-type charging order
Estate exercises deceased or incompetent mem-
ber's power
List of records to be kept
Partner has non-partner rights when transaction
business with partnership
Provisions for derivative suits
As agreed or on notice per statute
Power but not necessarily right
List of events specified
Liable for damages
Events dissolving partnership
Unanimous within 90 days
Order of distribution of assets
Exclude wrongfully dissolving managers
Certificate required before transacting business
Foreign law governs internal affairs and member
liability of foreign LLC
LLC may not defend suit, but no effect on
member liability or contracts
Member(manager) in member(manager) -man-
aged LLC binds in ordinary transactions
Member must account for LLC benefits derived
without co-member consent


































'Citations are to the Model Business Corporation Act (1991) ("MBCA"); RULPA, 6 U.L.A. at 355; UPA, 6 U.L.A.
at 1.
2This provision is also similar to corporate-type provisions. See, e.g., MBCA § 15.03.
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B. Implicit Linkage: The Problem of LLCs
LLC statutes import language from the three other major business forms:
general and limited partnerships and corporations.176 The following table
shows the extent to which LLC statutes have borrowed from other statutes.' 77
Borrowing from these statutes implies linkages between LLCs and the forms
from which language is imported. Courts could, therefore, interpret LLC
provisions by applying case law from these other forms. Such linkage has some
benefits for LLCs. Because LLC statutes provide for a new standard form,
there are no cases dealing with the many issues that may arise under the
statutes. Linking LLCs and other standard forms would provide LLC law with
interpretive materials associated with the linked forms, just as does linking LLPs
with general partnerships. 178 This, in turn, encourages more firms to use the
LLC form. The fact that the first LLC statute, enacted in Wyoming, was drawn
largely from the Wyoming corporation statute 79 indicates that legislatures
recognize this advantage of linkage.
On the other hand, part III of this article demonstrated that the value of
linking case law is minimal with regard to many types of both specific and
general rules.Y Moreover, linkage has the potential costs of encouraging
courts to apply inappropriate rules to LLCs. Thus, even if linkage has
advantages for LLCs, courts should interpret LLC statutes as independent
standard forms, at least in the absence of explicit linkage language or other
direct indicia of legislative intent compelling linkage.
Indeed, there are several important differences between LLCs and the forms
from which LLC statutes borrow provisions that make linkage unsuitable for
LLCs in light of the coherence and gap-filling objectives of statutory standard
forms.' All LLC statutes provide for limited liability.1" Also, while all
statutes allow the LLC to be managed by managers and provide alternative
default rules for manager-managed firms," the vast majority provide for a
176. LLC statutes also may include explicit linkage language. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 17153
(West Supp. 1995) (providing that manager's fiduciary duties are those of partner); 15 PA. CONS. STAT.§ 8904 (Supp. 1994) (providing that "[ulnless otherwise provided in the certificate of organization, in
any case not provided for in this chapter," general partnership law applies to member-managed LLCs
and limited partnership law to manager-managed LLCs). These provisions raise interpretive questions
similar to those discussed in part II.A concerning the explicit linkage of limited and general
partnerships, including instances where an issue involves a case for which the LLC statute does not
provide. The Pennsylvania statute raises additional questions about the interpretation of certificate
provisions that purport to waive linkage.
177. For tables of specific state provisions in these categories, see LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT
R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES (1992 & Supp.).
178. See supra part III.A.2.
179. See William J. Carney, Limited Liability Companies: Origins and Antecedents, 66 U. COLO. L.
REV. (forthcoming 1995).
180. See supra part III.A.2.
181. See supra part III.B.2-3.
182. See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 177, App. 12-1.
183. See id. § 8.04, at 8-9 (Supp. 1994) (discussing management of LLCs by managers).
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default rule of direct management by members.8" Thus, LLCs differ from
limited partnerships in the decentralized-management default and in the limited
liability for all members, from general partnerships in the alternative central-
ized-management default and in the limited liability of all members, and from
corporations because of the decentralized-management default and in the
greater informality allowed by LLC statutes. Because of these differences,
linking LLCs with any of these other forms would create a problem in the
coherence of the linked provisions with those of the LLC statutes.
Two examples illustrate this problem. First, as indicated in Table 1, most
LLC statutes adopt the general partnership default rule that each member of a
member-managed LLC and each manager of a manager-managed LLC can, like
partners in a general partnership, bind the firm in the ordinary course of
business. Linkage would apply the large body of partnership cases in
determining members' and managers' power to bind in ordinary transactions.
It follows that partnership rules would apply to issues related to the power to
bind, including whether notice to, or an admission or wrongful act by, a member
or manager is binding on the firm,x85 and whether an unauthorized member
or manager can bind the firm.
This linkage with partnership agency rules, however, is inconsistent with the
LLC dual-default rule. Most LLC statutes provide that a member has no power
as such to bind an LLC that has opted out of the default member-manage-
ment.186 These statutes require an opt-out from decentralized management
to be embodied either in the articles or in a written operating agreement."
An LLC member's power to bind the firm depends, therefore, on factors that
are irrelevant in the partnership setting: whether the LLC selected a particular
management form, and whether the member can be characterized as a
"manager" if the firm has elected the centralized-management default. By
contrast, a partnership can alter a partner's power to bind only if the partner-
ship informs third parties." s It follows from these differences between LLCs
and partnerships that partnership law should not necessarily apply in resolving
agency issues in LLCs that are not explicitly covered by the LLC statute. For
184. Id. § 8.03 (discussing management of LLC by members). The exceptions are MINN. STAT ANN.
§ 322B.606 (West Supp. 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-69 (Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT ANN. tit. 18,
§ 2013 (West Supp. 1995); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 2.12 (West Supp. 1995). The
Minnesota and North Dakota statutes permit members to take action that otherwise must be taken by
managers and permit members to enter member control agreements. See MINN. STAT ANN. §§ 322B.37,
322B.606(2), 322B.67 (West Supp. 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-32-50, 10-32-69(2) (Supp. 1993).
185. For discussions of these issues, see RIBSTEIN & KEATING, supra note 177, §§ 8.11-.13. A few
LLC statutes provide specific rules regarding admissions by and notice to partners, in all cases by
adopting rules from the UPA. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.50.255-.260 (Supp. 1994); KY. REV. STAT. ch.
275, §§ 28,29; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §§ 642-643 (West Supp. 1994); Wis. STAT. § 183.0302-.0303
(West Supp. 1994).
186. See RIBSTEIN & KEATING, supra note 177, App. 8-1 (tabulating state provisions). For a
discussion of members' power to bind a centrally managed LLC, see id. § 8.09.
187. See id (tabulating state provisions).
188. See UPA § 9, 6 U.L.A. 132 (providing that a partner's act is not binding as to an ordinary
matter if the partner had no authority and the third party knew that this was the case).
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example, under an LLC statute that is silent on admissions and notice, an
admission by, or notice to, a nonmanaging member should not bind a manager-
managed LLC as to a third party who lacks knowledge that the member lacks
authority, if a general partnership would be bound in analogous circumstances.
A second example of the LLC linkage problem concerns members' power
to withdraw. As Table 1 shows, several LLC statutes have adopted the limited
partnership provision that gives general partners the power, but not necessarily
the right, to withdraw. Applying the general partnership default suggests that
in filling gaps in the statutes and agreements, the courts should assume that
LLC members may exit at will.1 89 Yet denying exit generally will impose less
severe consequences on limited liability LLC members than on partners who
need to halt their continuing liability. Accordingly, LLC members' power to
withdraw should at least be subject to contrary agreement. At the same time,
it is not clear that the withdrawal rule applicable to limited partners should be
applied to LLC members. Unlike limited partners, LLC members participate
by default in management and therefore contribute undiversifiable human
capital to the firm. They therefore need a remedy against potential oppression
by majority members. Accordingly, LLC members should have a default "put,"
even if limited partners should not have such a right. In general, therefore, the
rule on withdrawal from LLCs should differ from the rules applicable to both
general and limited partnerships.
Even if LLCs would gain more from the clarification provided by additional
interpretive materials than they would lose from linkage, it is important to keep
in mind that clarification need not be supplied by linkage. Rather, the clarity
and predictability of LLC law could be increased by widespread adoption of
uniform LLC statutory provisions. This would provide a nationwide set of
interpretive materials without creating erroneous linkages with other standard
forms.
Despite these potential advantages of uniformity, widespread adoption of the
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (the "ULLCA") recently promulgated
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws" is not
an acceptable alternative to linkage. Uniform laws generally entail potential
costs, including reducing desirable variations in LLC statutes and impeding the
evolution toward optimally efficient laws.19 The ULLCA itself is a good
189. These provisions also leave unclear the enforceability of an agreement that nullifies the
withdrawal power by denying compensation to or otherwise penalizing the withdrawing member. See
generally Larry E. Ribstein, Statutory and Planning Considerations for Withdrawal from an LLC, 1 J.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 64 (1994) (discussing various issues concerning statutory provisions on
LLC member dissociation).
190. See Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1995) (copy on file with author).
191. See Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Economic Analysis of Uniform Laws, 25 J.
LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 1996) (showing that some uniform law proposals are inefficient and that
states tend to adopt those that are efficient).
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example of the potential inefficiency inherent in such laws. 192 On the other
hand, LLC statutes have been evolving spontaneously in ways that fill gaps and
eliminate questionable linkages between LLC and other law.'93 This evolution
is evidence of a learning process that is correcting lawyers' and legislators'
previously incomplete understanding of the special niche occupied by the LLC.
Moreover, LLC provisions are evolving not only toward efficiency, but also
toward efficient uniformity."l This suggests that an evolutionary process can
produce any uniformity that is actually necessary to provide nationwide
interpretive materials.
C. Implicit Delinkage: Close Corporations
Firms can waive many of the provisions of business association statutes and
instead enter into customized arrangements. For example, corporations can
contract around the default rule of management by a board of directors.195
Similarly, large partnerships can contract around management directly by
members and adopt centralized management by managing partners. 96 These
arrangements raise the question whether nonstandard firms should be subject
to statutory terms that do not suit their form of business, but which they did not
waive. Application of statutory default terms could impose on closely held
corporations or centrally managed partnerships the costs of either having to
draft around inappropriate terms or being subject to the application of
unsuitable terms."9  Accordingly the courts should consider implicitly
delinking nonstandard firms from the statutes under which they were formed.
Some courts have indeed implicitly delinked closely held and publicly held
corporations. In Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England,98 the
court gave a minority shareholder a common law right of buyout in response to
the corporation's buyout of a controlling shareholder, despite the absence of
such a right in the statute. The court cited the special problems caused by
illiquidity in close corporations.'"
Delinkage is not, however, necessarily appropriate in this situation because
it fails to account adequately for the parties' intent expressed by their choice of
192. See Larry E. Ribstein, A Critique of the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 25 STETSON
L. REV. (forthcoming 1995); see also Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 120 (discussing the uniform
LLC Act as an example of the defects inherent in the uniform lawmaking process).
193. See Ribstein, supra note 123.
194. Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Evolution and Uniformity, ECON. INQUIRY
(forthcoming October 1995) (showing that states have spontaneously evolved toward desirable
uniformity in LLC statutes).
195. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a).
196. See UPA § 18, 6 U.L.A. at 213 (text before subsection (a)) (provision for management by
partners not listed among non-waivable provisions in subsection (a)); RUPA § 103,6 U.L.A. 286 (Supp.
1995) (provision for management by partners not listed among nonwaivable provisions in subsection
(b)).
197. See Ian Ayres, Judging Close Corporations in the Age of Statutes, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 365 (1992).
198. 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
199. Id. at 514-15.
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the corporate rather than the partnership form' and by their failure to
contract for protection."°1 The argument for implicit delinkage is particularly
weak for firms that elect not to form under available corporate statutory
provisions that relate to firms that elect and qualify to be close corporations.'
Thus, in Toner v. Baltimore Envelope Co., the court denied a common law
buyout, reasoning in part that the company could have, but did not, elect to be
treated as a special close corporation under the Maryland statute, which
provides for a partnership-type buyout. Likewise, Sundberg v. Lampert Lumber
Co.2" held that a Minnesota statute permitting buyouts in defined close
corporations precluded application of a common law buyout right to a
corporation that did not fit the definition of a "close corporation." The
Sundberg court reasoned in part that granting relief in this situation would
nullify another section of the statute that provided for just and equitable relief
for "unfairly prejudicial" conduct in all corporations. In these situations, the
availability of a more suitable statutory form supports inferences about the
parties' intent in failing to use the form, and therefore about how the court
should fill apparent gaps in the agreement.
To be sure, the parties may have chosen the corporate form only because,
prior to the advent of the LLC and the LLP, firms had no other way to combine
LLP default rules with flow-through tax treatment. Thus, where the regulatory
environment artificially limits the availability of statutory forms from which
firms can choose, perhaps courts should supply the contract the parties could
not make for themselves. However, once regulatory constraints on the
development of standard forms are relaxed so that there are separate forms to
suit many different types of firms, firms that select a particular form should be
held to the default rules associated with that form.
Finally, special close corporation statutes may raise linkage problems similar
to those in the LLP and limited partnership contexts. For example, in fact
200. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCrURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 246-47 (1991); Charles O'Kelley, Filling Gaps in the Close Corporation Contract: A
Transaction Cost Analysis, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 216 (1992).
201. See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993) (denying an oppression remedy to close
corporation shareholders on account of the corporation's establishment of a stock option program for
key employees, reasoning in part that the shareholders could have drafted for protection).
202. These statutes fall into four general types: (1) provisions applicable only to nonpublic
corporations or corporations that fit within a definition of "close corporation," which usually refers to
some combination of number of shareholders, absence of a public offering or listing on a securities
exchange, and use of stock transfer restrictions, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-31(b) (1990); MODEL
BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 7.32 (1991); (2) provisions applicable to any corporation that elects coverage,
e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'Ns §§ 4-101 to 4-603 (Michie Supp. 1995); TEx. BUS. CORP. AcT
ANN. arts. 12.01-.54 (West Supp. 1995); (3) provisions applicable to corporations that both elect to be
covered and meet a statutory definition of a "close corporation," e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 341-56
(Michie 1994); and (4) provisions that combine elements of the second and third types, i.e., that require
election only, except in the case of previously incorporated firms where qualification is required as well,
see MODEL STAT. CLOSE CORP. § 3,4 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT. ANN. CC-8 (Prentice Hall Supp.
1994).
203. 498 A.2d 642 (Md. 1985).
204. 390 N.W.2d 352 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
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situations in which close corporation provisions do not explicitly allow a buyout
or dissolution, it is unclear whether the courts should apply the partnership
model that is appropriate for many closely held firms or the corporate standard
form with which the close corporation provisions are associated.
VI
CONCLUSION
The current rules on linkage between general and limited partnerships are
confusing in themselves and lead to more confusion in interpreting and applying
the limited partnership statutes. Thus, the linkage provisions in the general and
limited partnership statutes should be eliminated, and the limited partnership
statute should be redrafted to stand alone, effective for partnerships formed
after the date of the change. These changes could be reinforced by eliminating
"partner" and "partnership" terminology in the limited partnership statute,
perhaps by providing for "managers" and "members" as in the LLC statutes.
Moreover, linkage has applications beyond limited partnerships to other
business forms and to other linkage mechanisms. These applications include
borrowing statutory terms, as in LLC statutes, and the use of the same statute
by business associations that differ in important ways, as in corporate statutes.
In general, despite the superficial attraction of enlarging the set of interpretive
materials available for standard forms, linkage should be applied cautiously and
avoided altogether where other gap-filling mechanisms, including explicit
statutory drafting, are available.
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